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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, Political Sub-
division of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appella.nt, 
vs. 
J. MARVEL HUTCHINSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8795 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees substantially with the· statement 
of facts set forth in appellant's brief, with the following 
exceptions: 
1. In the paragraph beginning 5 lines from the 
bottom on page 5 of appellant's brief and ending on 
page 6, there is an insinuation that defendant Hutchinson 
has perjured in his testimony that it was not he who 
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added, in pencil, a sketch of the plot plan with dimensions 
37' x 40'. This insinuation, colored by the phrase uit is 
interesting to note" is gratuitously misleading. Defendant 
Hutchinson has expressly denied making the pencil nota-
tion (R-34, line 15). Witness for Plaintiff, Griffith, an 
employee of the County Surveyor's office has admitted 
making certain of the pencil notations on the back of 
the application (R-66), and in response to direct ques-
tion of counsel for Plaintiff as to whether she wrote the 
words uten feet," stated uif I did, I don't remember" 
(R-66, line 29). 
2. On page 7 of Plaintiff's brief is the following 
language presented as a statement of fact: uMr. Horne, 
upon receiving the report from Mr. Daly called Mr. 
Hutchinson on the telephone and asked him in effect 
why he had built in violation, and Mr. Hutchinson in-
formed him that Mr. Duncan had told him to go ahead, 
that the County wouldn't do anything anyway." 
This is not a fact, but a statement attributed to 
Mr. Hutchinson by Mr. Horne two years after it was 
claimed to have been made. On direct examination Mr. 
Hutchinson made a direct denial of this statement to 
him. (R-43, lines 17 to 30 and R-44, lines 1 to 4). 
3. At least one addition to the facts as stated, is 
appropriate, and that concerns the form of permit used 
by Salt Lake County in this case. Attention is called 
to Exhibit 6-D, which is entitled ((Receipt and Building 
Permit," and to testimony concerning it (R-70, and 71). 
This permit, whi.ch was the one direct communication 
issued to defendant, Hutchinson, contains no identifica-
tion of the restriction contained in the Board's decision 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
and is distinguished by its informality and lack of direc-
tion to permittee and is even made a part of the routine 
receipt for two dollars. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE DECISION BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT 2 
THERE IS JUSTIFICATION IN HARDSHIP 
FOR A COURT OF EQUITY TO DENY THE 
COUNTY THE RIGHT TO WO·RK IRREPARABLE 
DAMAGE WHERE SUCH ACTION WILL SERVE 
NO USEFUL PURPOSE. 
POINT 3 
THE UPHOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION WILL NO·T ((EMASCULATE THE POW-
ER OF THE COUNTY TO· ENFORCE ITS ZONING 
ORDINANCES." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DECISION BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant submits what are claimed to be 3 errors, 
namely: ( 1) There is no support in the record for the 
finding made by the trial court that the violation of the 
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zoning ordinance by the defendant Hutchinson was an 
innocent violation; (2) there is no support in the law 
for the trial court imposing the duty on a building in-
spector to immediately find violations of the zoning 
ordinances, and if he does not find said violations, holding 
the county in effect has waived its right to enforce the 
zoning ordinances; and ( 3 ). the trial court considered 
matters entirely outside its: province, such as an official's 
reaction to an attitude considered as an affront or ornery, 
that abutting property owners did not consider the en-
largement as made a detriment. 
Concerning ( 1) , the record is replete with evidence 
of defendant Hutchinson's painstaking efforts both to 
comply with the ordinance as interpreted, and as his 
attorney advised him they would be interpreted, and to 
protect his life's investment in his business. When ad-
vised by his attorney that his application for enlargement 
to within 28 inches of the property line had been ((ap-
proved," his contractor dug the foundation and laid the 
footings. When advised, later by his attorney of the 10 
foot restriction, he held up construction until further 
enlightenment. After approximately two months, with 
his foundation lying idle and winter approaching, he 
was encouraged by his attorney that total approval would 
be gran ted. The attorney testified ( R -1 0 6) that this 
advice was based upon encouragement from appropriate 
officials, and (R-1 07) personal legal research. The permit 
to build (Exhibit 6-D) issued directly to defendant 
Hut.chinson by Salt Lake County, contained no identifica-
tion of the restriction. During the several months period 
between the digging of the foundation and erection of 
the building uto the square" no communication passed 
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to defendant Hutchinson from the building inspectors. 
When the inspectors made an examination and ordered 
him to stop construction, he then had the choice of 
making an expensive and apparently perfectly pointless 
removal of 10 feet of building, or putting on the roof 
to keep out the winter. Appellants cite the case of H. C. 
Hargraves, Building Inspector for Salt Lake City, vs. 
Harry L. Yo'l{ng, Kenneth L. Anderson, and Willia1n W at-
kenhorst, 1955, 280 P2, 974, 3 U2d. 175. as authority 
for the right of the county to enforce its zoning ordinances 
if the building inspector does not find violations early. 
That case did not involve equity, but rather the applica-
tion of a zoning ordinance to a carport and whether such 
carport was a ((structure" under the ordinance such as 
to bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare. 
As to the second alleged error, perta1mng to the 
duties of the building inspector, defendant Hutchinson 
does not claim that as a matter of law, the building in-
spector is clothed with the responsibility of making speci-
fied inspections, but rather that the failure of the build-
ing inspectors to perform such authorized duties was a 
contributing factor to Hutchinson's own clean hands. 
In answer to the third alleged error of the Court in 
considering material such as the inspector's interpretation 
of defendant's conversation as ornery and as an affront 
to authority, and attitude of abutting property owners, 
these and related matters are patently pertinent to the 
question of whether a court of Equity will allow an action 
which will serve no useful purpose. The abutting property 
owners to Defendant Hutchinson's property (R-87) and 
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(R-90) testified that they preferred the enlargement as 
made to the restiction which the County now seeks to 
enforce. They testified that the present enlargement did 
not depreciate their property, that it was preferable to 
a 10 foot clearance between defendant's store and their 
property. uln determining the question of the reasonable-
ness of a zoning restriction, the Courts will disregard 
mere form in order to insure protection of right injuriously 
affected by unreasonable and arbitrary action." 117 ALR, 
112&. 168 ALR 17. 
POINT 2 
THERE IS JUSTIFICATION IN HARDSHIP 
FOR A COURT OF EQUITY TO DENY THE 
COUNTY THE RIGHT TO WORK IRREPARABLE 
DAMAGE WHERE SUCH ACTION WILL SERVE 
NO· USEFUL PURPOSE. 
Appellants rely heavily on the case of Provo City, et 
al vs. Claudin at al, 1936 63 Pac. 2d 570 91 U 60. 
That was a case involving a permit to enlarge an 
existing structure for the purpose of operating a funeral 
home in a residential class B zone. While the Court in 
that case properly denied relief despite lack of objection 
by the building inspector during construction, the case 
is clearly distinguishable from the instant case in at least 
two particulars: ( 1 ) In the Claudin case, defendant was 
constructing his· building in clear and conclusive opposi-
tion of the Board of Adjustment, and (2) a useful purpose 
was being served in that depreciation of property values 
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to abutting property owners and the opposition of the 
same was clearly proved. 
In McCavic vs. DeLuca, 46 NW 2nd 873, also cited, 
the Court also held that the violation and consequent 
damage could not be considered trivial. 
The trial court's language on this point in the present 
case, is particularly significant. uAnd now the inspector 
seeks to compel the defendant to tear down the new 
structure or a part thereof, which would just wreck the 
building and its business, and serve no useful purpose. 
Reason and equity revolts against such action on a record 
and a situation such as this. To make a man who earnestly 
tried to improve his store to insure a livelihood for his 
family without detriment to anyone and, believing he was 
in full compliance with the law and was so advised, must 
suffer wreck and ruin" ( R -13 3 ) . 
Defendant Hutchinson's hardship under the county's 
a·ction is clearly set forth in the record. He has testified 
(R-83) that the enlargement is. necessary to the survival 
of his business due to (I) new and close chain store com-
petition, ( 2) changes in food inventories, particularly 
need for increased space to provide floor space for frozen 
foods and prepared foods, and that the county's action 
would not only cost him the opportunity to compete· but 
would cost him up to $2000.00 (R-84) for expenses of 
removal. His testimony is supported by expert testimony. 
(R-92-93). 
That no useful purpose would be served is conclusive-
ly supported by the previously cited testimony of abutting 
property owners, and by the complete absence of any 
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testimony in the record by plaintiff that any useful pur-
pose would be served. It is significant on this point, that 
the county's only witnesses at the trial were paid officials 
of the county. Not a single property owner or unpaid 
citizen pre sen ted evidence of deleterious effect. 
In Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Ut.-111, this Court 
stated: ((The restriction imposed must bear a substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare." While this was applied to the zoning laws in 
general, its application in equity to a hardship case, and 
in the total absence of testimony that this purpose is 
being served, is appropriate. 
Appellant has cited the landmark zoning case of 
Goreib v. Fox, 274 U.S. 60; 47 S. Ct. 675, 71 LEd. 1228, 
cited by this Court in the Hargraves case as authority 
for the proposition that the authority of the state should 
take precedence over the hardship to an individual. We 
have already distinguished the Hargraves case as involving 
the question of whether the definition of ((structure" 
should include a carport, and that the hardship involved 
is not of such consequence that Equity would place it 
paramount to a precedent which would strike at the 
heart of zoning itself. 
In the instant case we are not striking at a foundation 
stake of zoning as in the Hargraves case, but simply 
submitting that the individual's case should, in such im--
pelling circumstances as these, be given status. Here is 
a hardship, proved by the evidence to be of great conse-
quence, perhaps eventually the life or death of a business 
into which an individual has poured his life's investment 
of effort and means. His present position has resulted 
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from the good faith reliance upon advice which he had 
every reason to believe was competent. The advice was 
occasioned by both formal research and oral communica-
tion with pertinent officials. While the building inspectors 
may not have had the duty, they clearly did have at least 
the authority and ability to protect defendant Hutchinson 
from arriving at his present position. Now appellant 
seeks to inflict this hardship upon defendant without show-
ing that a good and useful purpose will be served, and 
when all the evidence at the trial indicates the exact 
oppos1te. 
POINT 3 
THE UPHOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION WILL NOT ((EMASCULATE THE POW-
ER OF THE COUNTY TO ENFORCE ITS ZONING 
ORDINANCES.'' 
This point is made because of the last sentence in 
appellant's CONCLUSION. No reasoning supports the 
assertion and the Court is asked to accept it at its face 
value. Obviously such a bald and extremist alarm must 
be answered. 
Appellant cites Sec. 17-27-23, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 for its authority to receive a mandatory injunction. 
The validity of this authority is not attacked by defend-
ant, nor is this Court being asked to over-rule the prece-
dent in the Hargraves and Claudin cases. 
The facts of the instant case stand alone as have been 
painstakingly delineated. No additional responsibility is 
being foisted upon the appellant or its officials. No avenue 
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of escape is being afforded future violators where the 
hardship is not of sufficient material degree, or where a 
useful purpose ·is ·shown., or where the information and 
guidance 'tO defendant has been less misleading. 
CONCLUSION -
It is submitted that the trial court gave proper weight 
to the evidence; that a mandatory injunction would serve 
no useful purpose but would inflict irreparable injury 
and hardship; that the upholding of the trial court's 
decision will not emasculate the power of the County to 
enforce its zoning ordinances, but will do substantial 
justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHERMAN P. LLOYD 
Attorney for Respondent 
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